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EURIPIDES’ OEDIPUS: A RESPONSE TO LIAPIS 
 
SUMMARY: This article examines the hypothesis, recently advanced by Vayos Liapis in this 
journal, that most of the quoted fragments of Euripides’ Oedipus belong not to that play but to 
a much later rhetorical exercise. It argues that the overwhelming majority of the faults alleged 
by Liapis are fully compatible with Euripidean language and style; and that even if the 
authenticity of one or two fragments can be called into question, there is no evidence to 
support the view that they come from a work written centuries after Euripides’ death. 
 
In a recent major article, Vayos Liapis argues that most of the fragments quoted by 
ancient authors as coming from Euripides’ Oedipus are not in fact by Euripides, but 
rather belong to a much later rhetorical exercise.1 He presents his case with enviable 
learning and skill, but another view may nevertheless be possible. In this article I 
argue that the overwhelming majority of the faults alleged by Liapis are in fact fully 
compatible with Euripidean language and style; and that even if the authenticity of 
one or two fragments can be called into question, there is no evidence to support the 
view that they come from a work written centuries after Euripides’ death. 
Let us first get an overall sense of the fragments, beginning with those quoted 
by other authors. Some are attributed specifically to Euripides’ Oedipus by at least 
one of the authors that cite them (frr. 540, 542-45, 546-54, 555).2 One is attributed to 
an Oedipus (fr. 541), although since this fragment comes from the Euripidean scholia, 
there is a presumption that Euripides’ play is meant. A further fragment (fr. 545a) has 
its first six lines ascribed to Euripides, and the rest to “tragedy”; the whole passage 
was conjecturally attributed to Euripides’ Oedipus by C. F. Hermann.3 Another has no 
attribution in its quoting author (fr. 539a), but was conjecturally attributed to 
Euripides’ Oedipus by Meineke.4 
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In the second half of the twentieth century our knowledge of the play was 
augmented thanks to the publication of several papyri. P.Oxy. 2455, a papyrus of the 
early second century AD containing an alphabetised list of Euripidean plays (offering 
in each case their title, first line, and narrative summary), was first published as 
Turner 1962a.5 It contains the first line of the play, explicitly stated to be such. Snell 
matched the papyrus text with a quotation of the line by Plutarch, which Meineke had 
already conjecturally ascribed to Euripides’ Oedipus – an ascription rejected by 
Nauck in his edition, who gave the fragment the designation Tr. Adesp. fr. 378.6 But 
thanks to the new evidence provided by the papyrus, Kannicht included the fragment 
among the fragments of Euripides’ Oedipus, as fr. 539a. 
A second papyrus, P.Oxy. 2459, from the fourth century AD, was published as 
Turner 1962b.7 The detailed description that it contains of the Sphinx and its riddle 
overlaps with text from Aelian (attributed to Euripides, overlapping with lines 2-3 of 
the papyrus), from Erotian (attributed to Euripides’ Oedipus, overlapping with line 2), 
from Athenaeus (unattributed, overlapping with line 2), and from Plutarch as cited by 
Stobaeus (unattributed, overlapping with lines 7–9; conjecturally ascribed to 
Euripides’ Oedipus by Valckenaer, but printed as Tr. Adesp. 541 by Nauck).8 The 
combined papyrus and quotations make up fr. 540 in Kannicht’s edition. 
Two more papyri published in the 1960s contribute further evidence for the 
play. P.Bodmer 25, from the second half of the third century AD, and first published 
by Kasser and Austin 1969, contains a marginal scholium that identifies lines 325-26 
of Menander’s Samia as coming from Euripides’ play (fr. 554b). And P.Oxy. 2536, 
from the second century, and published by Turner 1966, from Theon’s commentary 
on Pindar (first century BC), cites two lines which the author specifically attributes to 
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Euripides’ Oedipus. There is an overlap with a quoted fragment from Hesychius, 
itself specifically attributed to Euripides’ Oedipus (fr. 556). 
The table below, arranged by quoting author, reflects our current state of 
knowledge about the quoted fragments. As well as indicating whether or not a given 
quotation fragment overlaps with a papyrus, I have also stated for each individual 
fragment whether or not Liapis believes that it comes from Euripides’ play. 
 
Quoting 
author 
Attributed to 
Kannicht fr. 
number 
Overlaps 
with 
papyrus? 
Accepted by 
Liapis? 
Aelian Euripides 540 Yes Yes 
Athenaeus n/a 540 Yes Yes 
Clement of 
Alexandria 
Sophocles 542 No No 
Clement of 
Alexandria 
Euripides 545-46 No No 
Clement of 
Alexandria 
Euripides (lines 1–
6); “tragedy” (7-
12) 
545a No No 
Erotian Euripides’ Oedipus 540 Yes Yes 
Hesychius Euripides’ Oedipus 556 Yes Yes 
Hesychius Euripides’ Oedipus 557 No 
? 
(See fn. 9) 
[Menander], 
Monostichoi 
n/a 543 No No 
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Orion Euripides 542 No No 
Philodemus Euripides 542 No No 
Plutarch n/a 539a Yes Yes 
Plutarch 
(quoted by 
Stobaeus) 
n/a 540 Yes Yes 
Scholia to 
Euripides 
Oedipus 541 No No 
Stobaeus Euripides’ Oedipus 
542-45, 546-
54, 555 
No No 
Theosophia 
Tubingensis 
Euripides’ Oedipus 554a No No 
 
 
As will be apparent from the table, Liapis argues that every quotation fragment which 
matches a papyrus that provides evidence for Euripides’ Oedipus does indeed come 
from that play; and that every quotation fragment which does not match a papyrus is 
spurious.9 He believes that these spurious quotation fragments were not written by 
Euripides at all. Instead, they came from a rhetorical exercise composed hundreds of 
years later that was confused with Euripides’ play. Liapis argues for this on the basis 
that the quoted fragments presuppose an impossible plot, offer content impermissible 
in Euripidean tragedy, or show unEuripidean features of language and style. 
This view is open to challenge, and I respond to it in detail below, fragment by 
fragment, in the third and longest part of my case. However, two additional arguments 
against Liapis’s position can be raised – arguments that do not require any reference 
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to the specifics of plot contruction or to the details of language or style. I begin with 
these.  
 
I. According to Liapis, all the quoted fragments that have subsequently been 
discovered to overlap with a papyrus are authentic, whereas all the quoted fragments 
which do not benefit from such an overlap are inauthentic.10 Such a coincidence is, to 
say the least, remarkable. The papyrus gods have apparently given us enough  papyri 
to confirm the authenticity of all the genuine quoted fragments. They have not left any 
genuine quoted fragment without a helpful confirmatory papyrus; nor have they 
confused the issue by providing any papyrus of the putative rhetorical exercise which 
Liapis regards as the origin of all the other quoted fragments. Generous gods indeed, 
we might think. Is this really plausible? 
 
II. My second argument concerns the authors who cite the fragments that Liapis 
doubts. One of those authors is Philodemus, a scholar of extraordinarily wide reading, 
who knew more Greek than we ever shall.11 According to Liapis, Philodemus failed to 
distinguish between genuine Euripides and a much later piece of hack work that 
merely aped his style. Is this likely? Authors who quote texts do make mistakes, of 
course; we have seen one such mistake in the table above, when Clement attributed to 
Sophocles a fragment that he should have awarded to Euripides.12 But the error that 
Liapis posits is exceptionally grave. He believes that these authors (or previous 
authors from whom they took the quotations, if they were quoting at second-hand) 
and whoever originally excerpted the quotations that ended up in Stobaeus, Orion, 
and the like, mistook a play (or a scene of a play) written centuries after Euripides for 
the real thing, not through an error of memory or a slip of the pen, but by reading the 
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text in question, or a significant part of it, and getting it wrong. The failure of 
judgment that he hypothesises is enormous. 
Moreover, it is not even that the text in question, according to Liapis, was a 
particularly good imitation of Euripides. Liapis believes that he can identify the 
inauthenticity of this hypothetical work from a mere handful of lines, so riddled are 
they with errors and inconsistencies. On this basis (since there is no reason to think 
that the fragments quoted from the play were disproportionately prone to exhibiting 
unEuripidean features), the entire work would have offered many instances of 
language, style, and plotting inconsistent with genuine Euripides; a disastrous 
composition that would have embarrassed any author with a sense of shame. Yet a 
writer such as Philodemus, despite all his reading, was fooled. And he, and others, 
made this enormous error when a text of the real Oedipus by Euripides was in 
circulation – since if the play was being read at Oxyrhynchus in the fourth century, it 
was certainly being read in a wide variety of locations in the centuries before that.  
Raising this point requires us to consider briefly the Rhesus ascribed to 
Euripides, and the Prometheus Bound ascribed to Aeschylus. Both these plays, most 
scholars today believe, were not written by the playwrights to whom they were 
attributed for most of antiquity. According to my argument above, ought their 
inauthenticity not have been noticed? There are three reasons why this is not a 
satisfactory riposte, as follows. 
First, in the case of Rhesus, at least, its authenticity was indeed questioned; 
“some” suspected that the play was not by Euripides because it rather showed a 
“Sophoclean stamp.”13 
Second, the Rhesus falsely attributed to Euripides was probably written in the 
early fourth century, and the Prometheus Bound falsely attributed to Aeschylus was 
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probably written no later than about a quarter of a century after Aeschylus’ death in 
456.14 Plays written so early – barely after the lifetimes of the playwrights under 
whose names they would in time be transmitted – were more easily confused with the 
genuine work of Euripides and Aeschylus.15 By contrast, under Liapis’s hypothesis, 
an Oedipus written centuries after Euripides’ lifetime, when the Greek language was 
different and when dramatic conventions will have developed in directions quite 
unforeseen in the classical period, was taken to be a play by Euripides: a completely 
different proposition. 
Third, people in antiquity reading and quoting Rhesus and Prometheus Bound 
did not have access to any alternative, genuine Rhesus by Euripides or Prometheus 
Bound by Aeschylus.16 There was no opportunity, once Euripides’ Rhesus had been 
lost at an early stage in the transmission, for anyone to note the existence of two 
homonymous plays attributed to the same author and to wonder whether both were in 
fact by him. Under Liapis’s hypothesis, the Oedipus falsely ascribed to Euripides 
coexisted with the true Euripidean play for centuries, and yet educated authors are 
happy to quote the former as if it were genuine Euripides even though the real 
Euripidean play was well known, as the papyri testify. Playwrights did, of course, use 
the same title for different plays; but at least in the case of classical playwrights, one 
or both of the homonymous plays was assigned a sobriquet (probably no later than the 
fourth century, to assist the book trade and the growing reperformance tradition – 
people will have wanted to know exactly which play they were getting). Under 
Liapis’s hypothesis, both the genuine and the inauthentic play were presumably 
circulating under the unadorned title “Euripides’ Oedipus,” since no evidence for a 
sobriquet is preserved in any of the quotation fragments. Yet such a remarkable state 
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of affairs either did not trouble anyone, or at least did not trouble those learned and 
bookish authors who made the appalling blunder with which Liapis credits them. 
 
III. Either of the two arguments above on its own is, in my view, sufficient to cast the 
gravest doubt on Liapis’s case; taken together, their force is overwhelming. However, 
it is still worth examining Liapis’s individual arguments about each separate 
fragment; since even if his overall case seems improbable, he could be right about the 
authenticity of an individual fragment or group of fragments. In citing the fragments, I 
use Liapis’s own translations, in the interests of fairness. I begin with a fragment 
where the attribution to Euripides in the source text is problematic; I move on to three 
fragments where Liapis’s case against authenticity is based simply on the gnomic 
character of the fragments; and I conclude by considering the remaining fragments, 
where his case is based on language and, occasionally, inconsistency with the plot that 
Liapis reconstructs from the papyri. Within each section, I cite the fragments in the 
order that Liapis cites them; and to avoid innumerable repetitions of ‘Liapis 2014’, 
cite his article simply by page number throughout. 
 
1. Problematic attribution in the source text 
 
fr. 555 (B16) 
 
ἀλλ’ ἡ Δίκη γὰρ καὶ κατὰ σκότον βλέπει 
The truth is, Justice sees even in darkness 
 
Stobaeus cites this line, preceded by another line, under the lemma Εὐριπίδης 
Οἰδίποδος. But the preceding line is by Callimachus, as its coincidence with a 
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papyrus has revealed; and so the possibility must be acknowledged, as Kannicht 
notes, that the second line too has been misattributed. Kannicht’s doubts, which for 
Liapis (p. 354) constitute the reason for rejecting the authenticity of the line, did not 
in the end lead Kannicht himself to deny either that Euripides was its author, or that it 
came from his Oedipus. Nevertheless, that attribution is not certain, as Liapis is 
correct to highlight. He says nothing further about the likely origin of the fragment; 
when discussing his hypothesis of a late rhetorical exercise, he cites frr. B1-B15, but 
not B16. If the text of Stobaeus has indeed gone seriously awry here and the lemma 
Εὐριπίδης Οἰδίποδος does not belong with the line quoted above, there is, however, 
no reason to think that the line must have come from a work centuries after Euripides’ 
time, nor indeed from an Oedipus. A date in the fifth or fourth century is more likely, 
since plays from this period provided the preponderance of quotations in 
gnomological works like that of Stobaeus. So although Liapis is right to note the 
chance that this particular ascription is wrong, there is no support here for his 
hypothesis of a late rhetorical exercise. 
 
2. “Trite” gnomic fragments 
 
fr. 549 (B9) 
 
ἀλλ’ ἦμαρ <ἕν Nauck> τοι μεταβολὰς πολλὰς ἔχει 
But one day truly holds many changes 
 
fr. 544 (B10) 
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ἄλλως δὲ πάντων δυσμαχώτατον γυνή 
And besides, a woman is the hardest of all things to fight. 
 
fr. 554 (B14) 
πολλάς γ’ ὁ δαίμων τοῦ βίου μεταστάσεις 
ἔδωκεν ἡμῖν μεταβολάς τε τῆς τύχης 
The god gave me / gave us many transformations of our life and changes to 
our fortune 
 
Of the first of these fragments Liapis writes (p. 346) “The line seems 
unexceptionable, but the theme of the mutability of fortune is such a trite one, 
endlessly repeated and reworked in gnomologia and rhetorical handbooks, that the 
fragment could just as well be a concoction by a late teacher, gnomologist or 
apprentice orator”; of the second that (p. 347) “The idea that a woman is ‘the hardest 
of all things to fight’ or ‘the most ferocious of wild beasts,’ etc. is found already in 
fifth- and fourth-century drama . . . But similar sententiae are also common stock in 
gnomologies”; and on the third he argues that (p. 352) “the repetition τοῦ βίου 
μεταστάσεις – μεταβολὰς . . . τῆς τύχης is feeble” and that “the theme of the 
mutability of fortune [is] the tritest of gnomic topoi.” 
In each of these cases the main argument advanced against Euripidean 
authorship is the gnomic nature of the text.17 But if we are to eliminate all maxims 
from tragedy, we will have to wield the deleter’s scalpel with abandon. Moreover, 
without the context we cannot tell the use to which these maxims were put. What in 
isolation seems an unremarkable iteration of a standard idea might have been more 
pointed in the mouth of a particular character in a given situation. There is no reason, 
then, to treat any of these fragments with suspicion. 
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3. Language and/or content 
 
fr. 541 (B1) 
ἡμεῖς δὲ Πολύβου παῖδ’ ἐρείσαντες πέδῳ 
ἐξομματοῦμεν καὶ διόλλυμεν κόρας. 
Pressing Polybus’s son firmly to the ground we blind him and destroy the 
pupils of his eyes. 
 
The scholia to Euripides, who quote the lines, indicate that they are spoken by one of 
Laius’s servants. They imply a plot in which Oedipus’s blinding took place at the 
hands of a third party, before the discovery that his real father was Laius, and 
connected in some way with his killing of Laius. Such a startling account of the event, 
so different from that found in other authors, would be a characteristically Euripidean 
divergence from the typical version of a myth; one thinks (for example) of his 
decisions in Phoenissae to have Jocasta live on at Thebes as a figure of authority after 
the discovery of her incest with Oedipus, in Antigone to have Antigone end up 
married to Haemon, or in Electra to have Electra married off to a peasant farmer. 
Moreover, the apparent brevity of the description of the blinding may have been 
intended as a deliberate contrast with Sophocles’ play, where the blinding was a 
gruesome high point in the final scene, later itself augmented by interpolation.18  
The authenticity of these lines was first questioned by Schneidewin, who 
doubted that Euripides could have diverged from Sophocles’ account to such a 
degree.19 He noted that the scholia say simply “in Oedipus” (ἐν τῷ Οἰδίποδι), and 
that the name of another playwright could easily have dropped out. Such a mechanical 
error by the original commentator or by subsequent copyists would have been easy. It 
is inevitable that some fragments in our editions are wrongly attributed because we 
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are relying on a single attribution that happens to be wrong, but which we are in no 
position to disprove. Oedipus plays by other authors did exist: we hear of such plays 
by Achaeus, Philocles the Elder, Xenocles (victorious at the Dionysia in 415 with a 
tetralogy made up of Oedipus, Lycaeon, Bacchae, and satyric Athamas), Nicomachus 
of Athens, Meletus the Younger (an Oedipodeia, dated c. 399, the same year that 
Meletus took part in the prosecution of Socrates), Nicomachus of the Troad, Carcinus 
the Younger, Diogenes of Sinope, Theodectes, Timocles (victorious at the Dionysia in 
339), Lycophron (two Oedipus plays), and Nicomachus of Alexandria.20 On the other 
hand, in the Euripides scholia it would be legitimate to refer to Euripides’ Oedipus 
simply as Oedipus; if an author’s name has not dropped out, Euripides’ play is the 
only one that could be meant by this designation in this context. And we should not 
posit that a name has dropped out if we do not have good cause to advance that 
hypothesis. 
Liapis offers several arguments against the authenticity of the fragment. (1) 
“In fifth-century tragedy subjects cannot be expected to attack, let alone disfigure 
their kings, much as a king’s fall is a favorite tragic theme” (p. 317). (2) The blinding 
cannot have been towards the end of the play (as we would naturally have expected), 
since in that case (i) “there would have been little or no time for Oedipus’s identity as 
son of Laius and Jocasta to be revealed” (p. 317), (ii) “even if both Oedipus’s forcible 
blinding and the revelation of his true identity could somehow be crammed into the 
same play, the climactic effect of the one would surely have undermined that of the 
other” (p. 318), and (iii) “Laius’s servants would have surely recognized Oedipus as 
the murderer of their former master the moment he entered Thebes; it is hardly 
believable, therefore, that they should have waited until he was proclaimed king, 
married Jocasta and possibly had children by her” (p. 318). And if the blinding had 
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taken place before the action of the play, or early on in the drama, further problems 
result, which he describes. (3) It is not clear why Laius’ servants should have blinded 
Oedipus rather than denouncing or killing him (pp. 318-19). (4) “One would expect 
that the forcible blinding—whether a departure from the self-blinding that we now 
perceive as the canonical version of the myth or an ancient variant otherwise 
unknown to us—would have left some trace in later art or literature” (p. 320). (5) “In 
classical tragedy ἐξομματόω generally means ‘restore one’s eyesight,’ not ‘blind’ as 
it certainly does in our fragment” (p. 322) . . . “with one possible exception (ἐκχυμόω 
‘to extract juice from’ in the Hippocratic De morbis 2.47, VII.68 Littré), it is only in 
Hellenistic times—and much more so in the first centuries of our era—that ἐκ- 
compound verbs start to denote annulment or invalidation of the action expressed by 
the simple verb” (p. 323). (6) “There seems to be no point in the repetition 
ἐξομματοῦμεν καὶ διόλλυμεν κόρας except to pad out the line” (p. 323). (7) 
“διόλλυμεν κόρας is unidiomatic: διόλλυμι properly means ‘bring to nought,’ usually 
with a person or community as its object. The intended meaning here is obviously ‘we 
destroyed Oedipus’s pupils,’ i.e., ‘we blinded him,’ but in this case the uox propria 
would have been διαφθείρομεν κόρας (admittedly unmetrical)” (p. 324). 
My reply to these points is as follows. (1) There may be no other example in 
tragedy of subjects attacking their ruler, but it seems excessive to elevate this into a 
canon of the genre. Such attacks are rare because they do not on the whole form part 
of the mythology from which tragedy takes its plots; but there was nothing to stop a 
tragedian in search of an innovative approach to a well-worn myth from introducing 
such a variant if he so wished.21 Moreover, as Martin Cropp points out to me, it is not 
certain that Oedipus was ruler of Thebes at this point; he is referred to merely as the 
son of Polybus. (2) A competent playwright could have structured a climax to his play 
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whereby Oedipus’s role in the killing of Laius was discovered, and punished, ahead of 
the discovery of his real paternity. That indeed is the direction in which Sophocles’ 
Oedipus the King appears to be heading during the long central scene between 
Oedipus and Jocasta, when Oedipus begins to suspect that he is a regicide, but has not 
begun to grasp that he is also a parricide. As for the point about Laius’s servants, we 
know too little about the plot to be able to state that there is no possible scenario in 
which (as appears from the fragment) they blind Oedipus when his killing of Laius 
has become clear but his real paternity has not. Greek tragedy does not typically 
proceed with the same regard for strict logic that we might expect of the modern 
detective novel, as we are well aware in the case of Oedipus the King – why, in that 
play, does Oedipus fail to summon the only surviving eyewitness to the killing of 
Laius in the first episode? Why does he ignore crucial pieces of evidence from 
Tiresias and Jocasta that should have led him to the truth a long time before he 
actually reaches it? And so on.22 (3) In the absence of the complete play, we will 
never know why Laius’s servants blinded Oedipus rather than killing or denouncing 
him. Perhaps they had previously decided that such a fate would have been more 
painful to endure than mere death; perhaps the blinding was intended to be a prelude 
to further torture and subsequent death; and so on. The possibilities are endless, and it 
is not appropriate for a modern scholar to declare that such an event could not have 
happened in a Euripidean tragedy. This may, indeed, be an instance of where 
Euripides has changed one major aspect of a myth (making the servants of Laius 
responsible for the blinding) and retained another (the blinding itself); compare how 
in Electra he introduces a new element to the story by marrying Electra off to a mere 
farmer, but simultaneously retains the inherited detail that she was a virgin. (4) The 
dominance of Sophocles’ Oedipus the King in later times is explanation enough for 
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why this variant on the traditional myth was not taken up in subsequent (surviving) art 
or literature. (5) Liapis’s detailed account of the changing semantics of ἐκ– verbs over 
time is convincing. He has shown that such a meaning in the fifth century would be 
highly unusual, but not that it can be ruled out. There has to be a first instance in 
extant literature somewhere, and such an instance might well have been in Euripides; 
Liapis cites a text with such a sense from the fourth or third century, and as such the 
semantics do not require us to posit the existence of a much later work. (6) The 
repetition is rhetorically effective in the description of Oedipus’ blinding, a significant 
moment in the play, and if the first verb involved a linguistic usage rather bold in 
Euripides’ time, then (as Referee 2 points out) the iteration of the same idea would 
have clarified its sense. (7) The expression that Liapis condemns seems within the 
bounds of what would be acceptable in Greek poetry; using a word in a slightly 
extended sense when the context makes that clear is far from unusual. 
The strongest point that Liapis advances is number (5). This might be an 
indication that the fragment comes from a fourth-century tragedy, but it is far from 
imposing this conclusion, and a Euripidean origin is still more than possible; as a 
result, I would continue provisionally to accept Euripidean authorship of the 
fragment. Whatever we conclude on that point, Liapis’s argument provides no support 
for the idea that the fragment comes from a much later work on the Oedipus myth. 
 
fr. 542 (B2) 
 
οὔτοι νόμισμα λευκὸς ἄργυρος μόνον 
καὶ χρυσός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ κἀρετὴ βροτοῖς 
νόμισμα κεῖται πᾶσιν, ἧι χρῆσθαι χρεών. 
I tell you, bright silver and gold are not the only currency, but virtue too is for 
all mankind an established currency, which they should use. 
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Noting the usual topos that virtue is superior to human wealth, Liapis objects to its 
particular instantiation here (p. 325): “The intractable καί in κἀρετή shows that virtue, 
far from being proclaimed superior to silver and gold, is rather envisaged as being on 
a par with silver and gold—as just another form of currency”23 while “the whole idea 
of virtue as a form of coinage is a feeble and rather incoherent one.” But for a poetic 
parallel for equality when superiority might be more naturally expected, albeit from 
Hebrew poetry rather than from Greek, cf. Song of Solomon 8.6 κραταιὰ ὡς 
θάνατος ἀγάπη, σκληρὸς ὡς ᾅδης ζῆλος (‘Love is as strong as death, jealousy 
unyielding as the grave’). There is no reason why Euripides should have reproduced 
the topos in exactly its usual form, since by varying it he shows his skill as a poet. 
Indeed, above we saw Liapis objecting to fragments because they (in his view) 
reproduce a topos in a hackneyed manner; we might have hoped that he would 
welcome the originality of the thought here rather than dismissing it as a ‘feeble and 
rather incoherent’ conceit. His objection to πᾶσιν, that it implies that “virtue is a kind 
of currency, which—unlike silver and gold—is available to all people,” seems 
misplaced too. First, καί implies that everything predicated of ἀρετή is true also of 
ἄργυρος and χρυσός, so his phrase “unlike silver or gold” is misleading. Second, his 
paraphrase “available to all people”, as Referee 1 points out, “prejudices the issue: the 
dative need only mean “in the eyes of” (“for all mankind an established currency,” his 
translation on his p. 325, is better than his paraphrase quoted here, because his 
translation does not imply that all mankind actually are (able to be) virtuous).” 
Liapis’s additional scepticism (p. 327) towards the phrase λευκὸς ἄργυρος, as 
being unique in the fifth century, cannot be justified. For what it is worth, Aesch. fr. 
310 is the only place in classical Greek where λευκός qualifies χοῖρος, but there is no 
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reason to doubt the authenticity of that fragment on this ground. He cites Eur. fr. 790a 
οὐκ ἔστ’ ἐν ἄντροις λευκός, ὦ ξέν’, ἄργυρος, rightly pointing out that the attribution 
to Euripides is conjectural; but even if the line is not Euripidean, it could still be from 
the fifth century. The central point against his argument is that some combinations of 
quite ordinary words will be attested only once in classical Greek, and, unless special 
circumstances apply, there is no reason to take such unique combinations as evidence 
for spuriousness. 
 
fr. 543 (B3) 
μεγάλη τυραννὶς ἀνδρὶ τέκνα καὶ γυνή  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
ἴσην γὰρ ἀνδρὶ συμφορὰν εἶναι λέγω 
τέκνων θ’ ἁμαρτεῖν καὶ πάτρας καὶ χρημάτων 
ἀλόχου τε κεδνῆς, ὡς μόνων τῶν χρημάτων  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
ἢ κρεῖσσόν ἐστιν ἀνδρί, σώφρον’ ἢν λάβηι. 
Children and a wife are a great kingdom for a man <text missing?> For it is, I 
say, an equal disaster for a man to lose children, fatherland and money, as (to 
lose) a good wife, since possessions alone <text missing?> truly (it?) is better 
for a man, if he gets a virtuous (wife). 
 
Liapis dislikes the metaphorical use of τυραννίς, noting (p. 329) that the fragment 
“uses τυραννίς as a metaphor to signify a precious possession. But a metaphor is 
precisely what τυραννίς never is in Euripides (nor, as far as I can see, in classical 
Greek literature)” and going on to conclude that “if a Euripidean character says, ‘a 
wife and children are a great τυραννίς,’ he must mean, absurdly, that through wife 
and children one can actually exercise real despotic power.” The fragment does 
indeed offer an original metaphor, but there is no reason to think that a later writer 
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was more capable than Euripides of employing striking imagery.24 Moreover, the now 
lost context may have paved the way for the metaphor, making it easier to understand. 
For example, Hector’s bold claim (Hom. Il. 12.243) 
εἷς οἰωνὸς ἄριστος, ἀμύνεσθαι περὶ πάτρης 
 
One omen is best, to fight on behalf of one’s country 
would be paradoxical if that line had survived merely as a fragment in isolation. How 
is it, scholars might ask, an omen to fight for one’s country? One might do that in 
response to an omen, or to fulfil some omen, but how could such fighting itself 
actually be an omen? And so on. But because the context of the line survives, we can 
see that Hector is using the term contemptuously, after a preceding passage in which 
he dismissed the omens cited by his brother Polydamas to encourage him to check his 
troops’ advance. In our fragment too, the immediately preceding lines could have 
supported the metaphor somehow; perhaps the value of holding political power was 
being debated, and contrasted with the enjoyment derived from family life.25  
Moreover, given our ignorance of the context, we cannot rule out the 
possibility that the line comes from a different place altogether, and τυραννίς is the 
subject, which results in the sense “Absolute power is, for a man, (as valuable as) a 
wife and children;” thus Referee 2, noting that the line could have been “attracted to a 
context in which the value of wives and children is spoken of.”  
Liapis’s further objections to the fragment are no more compelling. So his 
argument that “Line 1 extols the value of having a wife and children, whereas lines 2–
5, though seemingly explaining (γάρ) line 1, speak of the pricelessness of a good wife 
only” (p. 330) is unsatisfactory because there may have been some reason why the 
loss of a wife needed to be highlighted at that point in the speech. Poetry is not always 
completely logical or consistent; and there is no reason why we should expect a later 
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writer to be less logical than a classical one. Moreover, we are dealing here not just 
with a fragment, but a lacunose one, and this should make us all the more cautious 
about asserting what Euripides could and could not have done. There is plainly a 
lacuna between lines 4 and 5, and an excerptor capable of leaving out one block of 
text could just as easily have omitted two. And to claim that a fragment cannot be 
Euripidean on the ground of the progression of its thought, when that thought is 
interrupted by two gaps of indeterminate length, is bold indeed. Liapis’s complaint 
that “hypothetical lacunae provide only an illusory solution to the syntactic anomalies 
of the passage” (pp. 331-2) does not note that his argument, too, is a hypothesis; and it 
seem easier to posit lacunae in a single fragment than the existence of an entire new 
work.  
His further objection to “the unusual number of apparently otiose repetitions” 
(p. 331) does not take account of how common repetitions are in ancient poetry. The 
“unusual number” of repeated words is two: ἀνδρί and τέκνα/–ων (Liapis also cites 
γυνή and ἀλόχου, but although these mean the same thing they are different words). 
Across this passage of at least seven lines (allowing for two lacunae of at least one 
line) ἀνδρί is repeated twice (1, 2, 5), τέκνα/–ων once (1, 3). For this to be 
suspicious, Liapis would need to formulate a plausible rule about tragic repetition that 
this passage violated; it is not easy to imagine what such a rule would look like. 
Liapis questions the lacuna after line 4, which in his view presupposes that 
“the subject changed rather dramatically into a demonstration of why ‘money alone’ 
is not enough for a man to be happy—quite a radical departure from the laus uxoris 
that is the theme of the previous lines” (p. 332). But such a statement could have been 
made briefly enough, as part of the praise devoted to the wife; moreover, χρημάτων 
in 4 could have entered the text from 3, displacing some other word (such as 
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κτημάτων, suggested by Weil, as Liapis notes). It seems futile to deny Euripidean 
authorship of a fragment, and indeed to attribute it specifically to a work from 
centuries later, on the basis of a guess concerning what may or may not have stood in 
a lacuna of indeterminate length. As for Liapis’s claim that the fragment “with its 
mention of Oedipus’s wife and children, is incompatible with fr. 540 in which 
Oedipus has only recently defeated the Sphinx . . ., and so must be still unwed and 
childless” (p. 332), this rests on an illegitimate inference about fr. 540 which I have 
dealth with above (see n. 23). 
 
fr. 545 (B4) 
 
πᾶσα γὰρ δούλη πέφυκεν ἀνδρὸς ἡ σώφρων γυνή· 
ἡ δὲ μὴ σώφρων ἀνοίαι τὸν ξυνόνθ’ ὑπερφρονεῖ. 
Every sensible wife is her husband’s slave; any who is not sensible looks 
down upon her partner out of folly. 
 
Taking these words to be the utterance of Jocasta, Liapis argues that “the idea that a 
good wife should comply with her husband in all things rather than contradict him is . 
. . put forth in [tragedy, but] there never is the slightest hint that such a wife must also 
be her husband’s slave” (p. 334). But we do not know who spoke these lines, or in 
what context. A situation in which an overbearing male character delivers these lines 
is not hard to imagine. Equally, a female character may have had some purpose in 
emphasising her obedience in such emphatic terms. Without knowing the context, it is 
rash to claim that it is impossible.26 
Liapis additionally objects to the language of the piece: (1) that the lack of an 
article with ἀνδρός is unidiomatic; (2) that πᾶσα . . . ἡ σώφρων γυνή should be 
 21 
πᾶσα σώφρων γυνή or ἡ σώφρων γυνή; (3) that πᾶσα γάρ “is multiply suspect: 
the syntagma occurs nowhere else in Euripides; it provides a convenient building 
block with which to begin both trochaic and anapaestic lines; and it looks like a 
ready-made tool for facile, gnomology-like generalizations”; (4) that “ἀνοίαι 
following hard upon ἡ μὴ σώφρων creates an offensive redundancy”; (5) and that “ὁ 
ξυνών = “husband” is unattested in classical tragedy outside of the present fragment 
and the equally suspect fr. 545a (B5).” 
To take these points in turn: (1) For the bare genitive ἀνδρός in the sense 
“her/your own husband” cf. fr. 546.1, Tro. 665-66 καίτοι λέγουσιν ὡς μί’ εὐφρόνη 
χαλᾶι | τὸ δυσμενὲς γυναικὸς εἰς ἀνδρὸς λέχος, El. 1072-73 γυνὴ δ’ ἀπόντος 
ἀνδρὸς ἥτις ἐκ δόμων | ἐς κάλλος ἀσκεῖ, διάγραφ’ ὡς οὖσαν κακήν. (2) As Martin 
Cropp suggests, if we translate the phrase “The sensible wife is wholly her husband’s 
slave” the problem disappears. (3) It is of no significance that πᾶσα γάρ occurs only 
here (and in two other fragments attributed to Euripides’ Oedipus); in a limited corpus 
such freak results involving the combination of two words are to be expected, and 
instances of πᾶς γάρ, πᾶν γάρ, and πάντα γάρ are not hard to find. (4) 
Redundancy is a natural feature of language in general and tragic language in 
particular; here we might just as well refer to effective repetition of the same key idea 
using a different term. (5) σύνεστι denoting marriage or sexual union is not unusual in 
tragedy (cf. Eur. Hel. 296-97, Soph. El. 275-76). 
 
fr. 545a (B5) 
 
εὖ λέγειν δ’, ὅταν τι λέξηι, χρὴ δοκεῖν, κἂν μὴ λέγηι, 
κἀκπονεῖν, ἃν τῶι ξυνόντι πρὸς χάριν μέλληι †λέγειν. 
. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
ἡδὺ δ’, ἢν κακὸν πάθηι τι, συσκυθρωπάζειν πόσει 
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ἄλοχον ἐν κοινῶι τε λύπης ἡδονῆς τ’ ἔχειν μέρος 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
σοὶ δ’ ἔγωγε καὶ νοσοῦντι συννοσοῦσ’ ἀνέξομαι 
καὶ κακῶν τῶν σῶν ξυνοίσω, κοὐδὲν ἔσται μοι πικρόν 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
οὐδεμίαν ὤνησε κάλλος εἰς πόσιν ξυνάορον, 
ἁρετὴ δ’ ὤνησε πολλάς· πᾶσα γὰρ †ἀγαθὴ† γυνή, 
ἥτις ἀνδρὶ συντέτηκε, σωφρονεῖν ἐπίσταται. 
πρῶτα μέν γε τοῦθ’ ὑπάρχει· κἂν ἄμορφος ἦι πόσις,  10  
χρὴ δοκεῖν εὔμορφον εἶναι τῆι γε νοῦν κεκτημένηι· 
οὐ γὰρ ὀφθαλμὸς †τὸ κρίνειν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ νοῦς 
She (sc. a good wife) should think that he (sc. her husband) speaks rightly 
whenever he says anything, even if he does not; and she should work to 
achieve whatever is likely to gratify her partner through her words(?). <Text 
missing?> It is pleasing too, if her husband has some setback, for a wife to put 
on a sad face with him and to join in sharing his pains and pleasures. <Text 
missing?> Now that you suffer this affliction, I will endure sharing your 
affliction with you and help to bear your misfortunes; and nothing will be 
(too) harsh for me. <Text missing?> Beauty benefits no wedded woman in 
regard to her husband, but virtue benefits many. Every good(?) wife who has 
melted in union with her husband knows how to be sensible. Her first 
principle is this: even if her husband is unhandsome, to a wife with a mind at 
all he ought to appear handsome; what judges(?) <a man?> is not the eye but 
the mind. 
 
Liapis complains that (1) “the repetition of λέγειν is as disagreeable as it is pointless” 
(p. 336); (2) the “emphasis on gratification by deeds in line 2 should have been 
complemented by a symmetrical emphasis on gratification by words in line 1” (p. 
337); (3) συσκυθρωπάζειν (“to put on a sad face with him”) is “oddly specific” (p. 
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337) and nowhere else occurs in serious poetry; (4) “Jocasta’s statement that a wife 
should participate not only in her husband’s grief but also in his joy comes across as 
an irrelevance in this context” (pp. 337-38); (5) “the addition of ἐν κοινῶι (‘in 
common’) creates a tautology with ἔχειν μέρος” (p. 338); (6) ὤνησεν εἰς πόσιν 
(which he takes to mean “for the purpose of finding a husband”) “is an odd phrase: 
whereas ὤνησεν εἴς τι (e.g., εἰς γάμον) is acceptable Greek, ὤνησεν εἴς τινα (εἰς 
πόσιν) is not” (p. 339); (7) “the syntagma οὐδεμίαν ὤνησεν is prosaic, and οὐδεμίαν 
in particular occurs nowhere else in tragedy except in the lyric Soph. El. 142” (p. 
339); (8) “Instead of ‘for every good(?) wife who has melted in [loving] union with 
her husband knows how to practice sound-mindedness,’ one should have expected the 
speaker of these lines to say, inversely, ‘a woman who has sound-mindedness will 
melt in loving union with her husband,’” (p. 340); (9) “the use of συντέτηκε in line 9 
to signify intense love [is] a nearly unparalleled usage” (p. 341); (10) μέν γε is a 
combination suspect in serious poetry. 
But (1) seems more of a personal reaction to the text than a reason to question 
its authenticity, especially since ancient tolerance of repetition was different from 
ours; moreover, there seems to be rhetorical point in this repetition, which 
concentrates attention on the act of speaking and the correct manner of going about it. 
(2) begs the question; why should Euripides have been required to express a wife’s 
duties by means of a symmetrical expression rather than by the means that he seems 
to have chosen? (3) As Martin Cropp says, ‘looking as unhappy as he does is step one 
in showing her sympathy with him’ (MC’s italics), and for the emphasis on the facial 
expression of an unhappy person cf. Alc. 773 οὗτος, τί σεμνὸν καὶ πεφροντικὸς 
βλέπεις; As for the verb itself, it is attested in Xenophon, and the uncompounded 
form in Aristophanes, Xenophon, and Plato, which means that we should not be 
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inclined to deny it to Euripides. (4) As Liapis himself points out, the speaker’s words 
could be a so-called polar expression in which one of the alternatives is more relevant 
to the speaker’s meaning than the former.27 (5) In place of “tautology” we might just 
as well say “effective reinforcement of a thought by the insistence on a key idea.” (6) 
εἰς here is no more problematic than at e.g. Soph. OT 706 τό γ’ εἰς ἑαυτὸν πᾶν 
ἐλευθεροῖ στόμα “with regard to himself, he keeps his speech completely clean,” 
since the phrase as whole could mean “with regard to, in her dealings with her 
husband” (see also (8) below). (7) The only other tragic occurrence of οὐδεμία is 
indeed in lyric; it also appears at Ibyc. fr. 286.7 PMGF. But if it is good enough for 
lyric, it can hardly be too prosaic for trochaic tetrameters. (8) The sense of the 
fragment seems inoffensive; the speaker is referring to how a wife can accommodate 
herself to her husband’s wishes during a marriage. (9) Liapis himself cites a 
Euripidean fragment with exactly this verb in this sense (fr. 296.2), and a Sophoclean 
passage (Tr. 463) that has ἐντακείη with this meaning (p. 342n138). (10) μέν γε 
appears at Agathon TrGF 39 F 8.1, but apparently nowhere else in tragedy. This 
might be significant, but is sufficient only to cast doubt on the individual phrase, 
which could be emended; it does not mean that the fragment as a whole has to be 
unEuripidean. 
As noted above, the whole fragment is attributed to Euripides’ Oedipus only 
by conjecture; its source, Clement of Alexandria, cites the first six lines as coming 
from Euripides, and the second six lines from ‘tragedy’. Although the attribution to 
our play has been generally maintained by scholars for nearly two centuries, the 
grounds for doing so are far from overwhelming; true, they would fit a play in which 
Jocasta showed sympathy to Oedipus after his fall, but they would also fit other 
situations, now unknown, in other lost plays. In the case of the last six lines, it is a 
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conjecture merely to say that they come from Euripides. I would therefore not include 
this fragment in an edition of the fragments of Euripides’ Oedipus. Yet Liapis’s 
arguments based on language and style do not help us to tackle the problem – for as 
we have seen, there is nothing here that could not be by Euripides. 
 
fr. 546 (B6) 
πᾶσα γὰρ ἀνδρὸς κακίων ἄλοχος, 
κἂν ὁ κάκιστος 
γήμηι τὴν εὐδοκιμοῦσαν. 
Every wife is inferior to her husband, even if the most inferior of men marries 
a woman of high standing. 
 
Liapis’s chief objection (p. 343) against the authenticity of this passage lies in 
κακίων, where the iota is short where we would have expected it to be long. James 
Diggle’s discussion of the phenomenon shows that none of the alleged parallels in 
classical tragedy is secure; in our passage he canvasses the possibilities that the word 
is corrupt (noting the conjecture χείρων) or that the passage is wrongly attributed to 
Euripides.28 Liapis counters, citing Christopher Collard, that the repetition κακίων . . . 
κάκιστος looks deliberate; so it might be, although alternatively original χείρων 
could have become κακίων under the influence of preceding κάκιστος. The prosody 
means that the attribution to Euripides is insecure; but if Euripides is not the author, 
there is no reason to suppose that the fragment long postdates him. Our data for 
fourth-century tragedy, for instance, is far too thin for us to deny that –ίων 
comparatives with short iota could have found a home there. 
Liapis finds fault with the article in τὴν εὐδοκιμοῦσαν, saying that it “would 
suit a superlative” (p. 343). But after the generalising statement in the first line, it 
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makes sense for the type of woman to be specified using the article. Compare fr. 
402.1-5 νόμοι γυναικῶν οὐ καλῶς κεῖνται πέρι· | χρῆν γὰρ τὸν εὐτυχοῦνθ’ ὅπως 
πλείστας ἔχειν | [γυναῖκας, εἴπερ τροφὴ δόμοις παρῆν], | ὡς τὴν κακὴν μὲν 
ἐξέβαλλε δωμάτων, | τὴν δ’ οὖσαν ἐσθλὴν ἡδέως ἐσῴζετο, where again, after a 
universalising claim about women, the speaker refers to specific types of woman by 
means of designations using the article followed by a non-superlative adjective.  
Liapis further objects that “the requisite article is missing before ἀνδρός in 
line 1: the sense requires ‘every wife is inferior to her own husband (τἀνδρός)’.” I 
have dealt with this point above (see fr. 545.1). 
 
fr. 547 (B7)  
 
ἑνὸς <δ’> ἔρωτος ὄντος οὐ μί’ ἡδονή·  
οἱ μὲν κακῶν ἐρῶσιν, οἱ δὲ τῶν καλῶν. 
Although love is a single thing, its pleasure is not single: some love what is 
bad, others what is good. 
 
Liapis calls attention to the strange thought expressed by this couplet, writing (p. 344) 
“If there is a difference between the pleasure derived from desiring good things and 
that derived from desiring bad things, then there must also be a difference between the 
respective desires themselves.” Yet again, we do not know the context; the second 
and final line of this fragment might have been only the first line of a longer 
explanation for the paradoxical statement with which the fragment opens. For 
example: “Although love is a single thing, its pleasure is not single. Some love what 
is bad, others what is good, some love women, some love men, some love peace, 
some love war; but the pleasure that they derive from their loves can be wholly 
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different in each case.” Or, as Referee 2 suggests, “but the pleasure derived from good 
things is lasting, that from bad things is fleeting.” If we can come up with these, 
Euripides certainly could have managed something better.  
After noting that “the motif ‘there is not one X but two, one good and one bad’ 
is a well-known topos” and citing parallels for it, Liapis claims (p. 345) that it 
“represents a botched attempt to reproduce the topos adumbrated above, whereby this 
or that emotion or activity is attributed a good and a bad aspect.” It seems more likely 
that the variation of the topos, drawing an unusual distinction between ἔρως and 
ἡδονή, supports Euripidean authorship; a mere hack writer is less likely to have 
created such an original thought. Moreover, Euripides is not saying that there are two 
sorts of pleasure – just that there is more than one. Liapis’s belief that two sorts of 
pleasure are at issue derives from his belief that the thought contained in the fragment 
is self-contained, but there is no reason to believe this. 
 
fr. 548 (B8) 
 
νοῦν χρὴ θεᾶσθαι, νοῦν· τί τῆς εὐμορφίας 
ὄφελος, ὅταν τις μὴ φρένας καλὰς ἔχηι; 
The mind is what to watch, the mind! What use is handsomeness when one 
does not have good sense? 
 
Liapis (p. 345) objects “φρένας καλάς will not do. The uox propria would be φρένας 
χρηστάς,” citing parallels for the latter expression; but it is the mark of competent 
poets that they do not always make use of the same expression as everyone else. The 
same objection can be raised against Liapis’s idea that θεᾶσθαι, usually “gaze intently 
at, take in with the eyes,” is the wrong word in this context, which requires the sense 
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“examine, focus one’s attention on”; the meanings do not seem so distinct that we can 
fairly deny Euripides the use of the word in this way. Indeed, a case can be made that 
both phrases are the result of artistic choice. As Martin Cropp argues, “καλάς is 
purposeful, pointing the contrast between a beautiful body and a ‘beautiful’ mind; and 
θεᾶσθαι similarly points the contrast between gazing on a beautiful body and ‘gazing 
on’ (i.e. admiring) a beautiful mind.” 
 
fr. 550 (B10a) 
 
ἐκ τῶν ἀέλπτων ἡ χάρις μείζων βροτοῖς 
φανεῖσα μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ προσδοκώμενον 
Delight resulting from unexpected events is greater for men when it appears 
rather than what is expected 
 
On this fragment Liapis states (p. 348) that “If we ignore the inept line 2, this is the 
only one among the anthologic fragments that is free simultaneously of linguistic 
errors, stylistic flaws, and triteness.” Like some previous editors, Kannicht deletes 
line 2, but Housman’s defence of the language (which he cites) seems adequate: 
“neither spurious nor corrupt, I must take heart to say. Construe φανεῖσα with ἐκ τῶν 
ἀέλπτων, and for the pleonasm μείζων μᾶλλον see Hec. 377 θανὼν δ ̓ ἂν εἴη 
μᾶλλον εὐτυχέστερος | ἢ ζῶν.”29 Kannicht counters that the order μείζων . . . 
μᾶλλον is unusual, but μᾶλλον may have been delayed to go next to ἤ. Yet even if 
line 2 is corrupt or spurious, there is no reason to doubt line 1; Kannicht does not, and 
Liapis admits that he can find nothing wrong with it. 
 
fr. 551 (B11) 
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φθόνος δ’ ὁ πολλῶν φρένα διαφθείρων βροτῶν 
ἀπώλεσ’ αὐτὸν κἀμὲ συνδιώλεσεν 
Envy, which ruins / corrupts the minds of many men, destroyed him and 
destroyed me with him. 
 
Liapis objects (pp. 348-49) (1) to the “poor jingle” produced by φθόνος – φρένα – 
διαφθείρων; (2) to the repetition ἀπώλεσε . . . συνδιώλεσε which, in his view, 
“probably betrays the hand of a poor versifier”; and (3) to the sense “corrupting 
people’s minds” for φρένα διαφθείρων βροτῶν, which in his view “is in all 
likelihood an aberration from tragic usage” since “διαφθείρειν in connection with 
φρένες indicates ‘deterioration from “sound-mindedness”’ or ‘mental or sensory 
deprivation,’ but never, apparently, ‘moral corruption’.” But objection (1) is arbitrary 
since tragic language and Greek in general abounds in assonance.30 Objection (2) can 
be countered by tragic parallels for similar repetition (involving a verbal stem and the 
same stem compounded with συν–), such as fr. 545a.5, Phoen. 1657-58 (Αν.) ἐγώ 
σφε θάψω, κἂν ἀπεννέπηι πόλις. | (Κρ.) σαυτὴν ἄρ’ ἐγγὺς τῶιδε συνθάψεις 
νεκρῶι, Tro. 62 συνθελήσεις ἃν ἐγὼ πρᾶξαι θέλω;, Her. 831-32 Ἥρα προσάψαι 
κοινὸν αἷμ’ αὐτῶι θέλει | παῖδας κατακτείναντι, συνθέλω δ’ ἐγώ, Suppl. 1006-7 
ἥδιστος γάρ τοι θάνατος | συνθνήισκειν θνήισκουσι φίλοις, Alc. 1103 νικῶντι 
μέντοι καὶ σὺ συννικᾶις ἐμοί, Soph. El. 495-98 πρὸ τῶνδέ τοι θάρσος| μήποτε 
μήποθ’ ἡμῖν| ἀψεγὲς πελᾶν τέρας| τοῖς δρῶσι καὶ συνδρῶσιν, Tr. 797-98 ὦ παῖ, 
πρόσελθε, μὴ φύγῃς τοὐμὸν κακόν, | μηδ’ εἴ σε χρὴ θανόντι συνθανεῖν ἐμοί, fr. 
953.1 θανόντι κείνῳ συνθανεῖν ἔρως μ’ ἔχει; cf. also Eur. Her. 754-55 (cited by 
Kannicht in his apparatus), where Lycus’s cry ἀπόλλυμαι δόλωι is followed by the 
chorus’s rejoinder καὶ γὰρ διώλλυς. As for objection (3), we again seem to be 
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dealing with distinctions of meaning finessed to extremes. Sound-mindedness and 
morality are hardly such sharply differentiated concepts in ancient thought that we 
can be confident that the verb could convey one of these nuances but definitely not 
the other. Even if we could, it is not certain that morality, and not mental judgment, is 
at issue here.31 
 
fr. 552 (B12) 
πότερα γενέσθαι δῆτα χρησιμώτερον 
συνετὸν ἄτολμον ἢ θρασύν τε κἀμαθῆ; 
τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν σκαιόν, ἀλλ’ ἀμύνεται, 
τὸ δ’ ἡσυχαῖον ἀργόν· ἐν δ’ ἀμφοῖν νόσος. 
Is it indeed more useful to be intelligent without courage, than both headstrong 
and crass? The one of these is foolish but defends itself; the other, which is 
peaceable, is lazy; there is weakness in both. 
 
Liapis writes (p. 349) “τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν is a redundancy: a simple τὸ μὲν γάρ 
would have made for better tragic idiom.” But the same construction is found at 
Bacch. 1054-6 αἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν . . . | αἱ δ’, with reference to the Maenads 
mentioned in the previous lines. He goes on to argue that “τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν (i.e., τὸ 
θρασύν τε κἀμαθῆ εἶναι) is an abstract notion that coheres rather ill with the concrete 
specificity of ἀμύνεται: head-strong and crass persons can be said to defend 
themselves; ‘the fact of being headstrong and crass’ cannot.” But that very verb is 
predicated of abstract ideas at Aesch. Ag. 102 ἐλπὶς ἀμύνει and Eur. Hcld. 302-3 τὸ 
δυστυχὲς γὰρ ηὑγένει’ ἀμύνεται | τῆς δυσγενείας μᾶλλον. Liapis’s further point 
(pp. 349-50) that νόσος “seems too strong a word to designate merely a 
‘shortcoming’ or ‘disadvantage’” seems wholly subjective, and again neglects our 
ignorance of the context – the speaker may have gone on to describe the 
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consequences of one or both of these mental states in such a way that justifies such 
strong vocabulary.32 
 
fr. 553 (B13) 
 
ἐκμαρτυρεῖν γὰρ ἄνδρα τὰς αὑτοῦ τύχας 
εἰς πάντας ἀμαθές, τὸ δ’ ἐπικρύπτεσθαι σοφόν 
It is stupid for a man to testify to his misfortunes in front of everybody; con- 
cealing them is wise. 
 
Arguing that these lines must have been spoken after the discovery of the truth about 
Oedipus, Liapis claims (pp. 350-52) that ἐκμαρτυρεῖν must then mean not “bear 
witness” (since there was no point in bearing witness to sufferings that had already 
happened), but “reveal, make public”; yet (he writes) ἐκμαρτυρεῖν in that sense is not 
attested before the mid-second century AD (and then in the middle). But the initial 
claim, that the lines imply a situation where Oedipus’s true situation has already been 
revealed, is not compelling; the τύχαι in question could have been almost anything, 
spoken by anyone with reference to anyone. The rest of Liapis’s argument thus 
becomes moot. 
 
fr. 554a (B15) 
 
ἐγὼ γὰρ ὅστις μὴ δίκαιος ὢν ἀνὴρ 
βωμὸν προσίζει, τὸν νόμον χαίρειν ἐῶν 
πρὸς τὴν δίκην ἄγοιμ’ ἂν οὐ τρέσας θεούς· 
κακὸν γὰρ ἄνδρα χρὴ κακῶς πάσχειν ἀεί. 
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Any man who, being unrighteous, sits in sanctuary at an altar—I would myself 
dismiss the law and take that man to justice without fear of the gods; for a bad 
man should always be treated badly. 
 
Liapis objects to the content of this passage; noting that elsewhere in tragedy attempts 
are made to dislodge suppliants from altars, he claims that in this passage (p. 353) 
“what is unparalleled is Creon’s (?) forthright and ruthless admission that he is 
prepared openly to disregard the gods by showing no fear of them.”33 In effect, he is 
positing a rule for classical tragedy: that although characters may try to remove 
suppliants from sacred places in defiance of the gods, they are not allowed to state 
that this is what they are doing in such terms. I see no reason to posit such a rule.34 
And again, we know nothing of the context of this passage – nothing of the character 
(presumably a highly uncongenial one) who uttered these words, and why. Their 
content provides no evidence for inauthenticity. 
Liapis addds (p. 354) that “The author’s characteristic incertitude regarding 
the use of the definite article . . . is once again very much in evidence here: πρὸς τὴν 
δίκην ἄγοιμ’ ἄν is unidiomatic: the formula is πρὸς δίκην ἄγειν.” But for τὴν δίκην  
in a quasi-legal context where we might have expected simply δίκην see Eur. Hcld. 
1025 οὗτος δὲ δώσει τὴν δίκην θανὼν ἐμοί, Andr. 358-9 αὐτοὶ τὴν δίκην ὑφέξομεν 
| ἐν σοῖσι γαμβροῖς, Soph. OR 551-52 εἴ τοι νομίζεις ἄνδρα συγγενῆ κακῶς | 
δρῶν οὐχ ὑφέξειν τὴν δίκην, οὐκ εὖ φρονεῖς; also Tr. Adesp. fr. 498 (of uncertain 
date) ἄγει τὸ θεῖον τοὺς κακοὺς πρὸς τὴν δίκην. 
 
*** 
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In the great majority of cases (thirteen fragments), there is no justification for the 
view that the quoted fragments attributed to Euripides’ Oedipus do not in fact come 
from that play.35 In two cases (fr. 545a = B5, fr. 555 = B16) we may doubt whether a 
fragment does come from that play because of problematic attribution in the text that 
cites it; the problematic nature of those attributions was known before the publication 
of Liapis’s piece. In two further fragments a linguistic or metrical issue casts a degree 
of doubt over the attribution of the text to Euripides; one of these (fr. 541 = B1), 
where a linguistic problem has been identified by Liapis, I would still provisionally 
retain as Euripidean, the other (fr. 546 = B6), where a metrical problem had 
previously been identified by James Diggle, I would provisionally reject. In these four 
fragments where a doubt concerning Euripidean authorship has some plausiblity, 
nothing whatsoever suggests the existence of a much later Oedipus wrongly attributed 
to the classical tragedian. 
Not only is it possible to counter the great bulk of Liapis’s arguments against 
individual fragments, but his overall case is stymied by two fundamental objections, 
set out as points I and II above. The combination of these points means that his bold 
and exciting hypothesis has virtually no chance of being right. I therefore hope that 
scholars and students will continue to cite the vast majority of these fragments as 
genuine, if frustratingly meagre, excerpts from Euripides’ Oedipus. 
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hospitality in Thessaloniki during April 2016, where much of this paper was written. 
1 Liapis 2014. 
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2 These and other fragment numbers in this article refer to TrGF unless otherwise indicated. One of 
these fragments, fr. 542, was attributed to Sophocles by Clement of Alexandria; but Philodemus and 
Orion attribute it to Euripides, and Stobaeus to Euripides’ Oedipus. 
3 Hermann 1837: 17–19. 
4 Meineke 1843: 289. 
5 For more recent analysis see Van Rossum-Steenbeek 1998: 20-21, 208-9. 
6 Snell 1963, Nauck 1889; Plut. Reg. et Imp. Ap. 205c, Cic. 27.4. 
7 See the review by Lloyd-Jones 1963: 446-47.  
8 Valckenaer 1767: 194. 
9 He nowhere mentions the tiny fr. 557; accordingly, I do not discuss it either. 
10 It is not a matter of papyrus fragments versus quotation fragments, as might be inferred from Liapis’s 
statement “papyrus fragments and quotation-fragments are not compatible as parts of a coherent plot—
a fact which, surprisingly, has gone largely unnoticed so far” (p. 308). Rather, it is a case of, on the one 
hand, papyrus fragments and those quoted fragments which happen to coincide with them, and on the 
other hand, all the other quoted fragments. 
11 In On Poetry 3 fr. 28 (pp. 88-89 Janko) Philodemus carefully analyses the literary merit of a 
tragedian whose name is not preserved (not one of the “big three”); Janko ad loc. compares a passage 
in On Poetry 2 which contrasts the merits of Euripides with those of Carcinus and Cleaenetus as 
writers of tragedy. 
12 For one remarkable case of misattribution see the text that appears as Soph. fr. 1126 in Pearson 1917 
(= Tr. Adesp. 618 TrGF) with Pearson’s n.; Christian writers from c. 150 C.E. onwards, including 
Clement, cite a passage of trimeters as coming from Sophocles when their content is blatantly 
monotheistic. 
13 Hypothesis (b) (Diggle 1994: 430.23-24) τοῦτο τὸ δρᾶμα ἔνιοι νόθον ὑπενόησαν, Εὐριπίδου δὲ 
μὴ εἶναι· τὸν γὰρ Σοφόκλειον μᾶλλον ὑποφαίνειν χαρακτῆρα; translation from Fries 2014: 22. 
14 “If the extant Rhesus is not by Euripides, it belongs in all likelihood to the first quarter or third of the 
fourth century BC” (Fries 2014: 28); for the date of PV see Sommerstein 2008: 433-4, 2010: 231-32. 
15 Cf. the description by Barrett 2007: 323 of the Greek written by the anonymous author responsible 
for the end of Aeschylus’ Seven Against Thebes as it survives in our manuscripts: “that hack was 
writing in Athens at a time when nondum obliti erant Athenis loquier lingua Graeca; and if I show him 
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to use that language without . . . solecisms . . ., I am merely showing him to possess the natural 
birthright of a fourth-century Athenian. His linguistic incompetence will manifest itself not in 
solecisms but in straining the language in what he mistakenly supposes to be the manner of Aeschylus, 
or in falling flat where Aeschylus would have risen”. 
16 There is no reason to think that Aeschylus wrote any play called Prometheus Bound. Euripides did 
write a Rhesus, but an error in the early transmission, probably at Alexandria in the third or second 
centuries (cf. Fries 2014: 23-28), led to the fourth-century Rhesus being attributed to Euripides, and the 
disappearance of the genuine Euripidean play. 
17 I say “the main argument” since he objects to repetition in the last of the three. But repetition is 
hardly unusual in tragedy, and what seems to him a feeble repetition seems to me an elegant enough 
chiasmus.  
18 Soph. OT 1266-81; see further Finglass (2017) on lines [1278-79], [1280-81]. 
19 Schneidewin 1852: 47-48. 
20 See TrGF I pp. 124, 141, 153, 155, 188, 212, 232, 252, 277, 286; also II pp. 15-16. 
21 Although it does not involve subjects killing a king or the death of a character who has previously 
appeared on stage, Neoptolemus is killed by an anonymous group of Delphians (primed beforehand by 
Orestes) at Eur. Andr. 1085-1165, showing that such lynching was conceivable within a tragic context. 
22 Liapis previously argues that “the Sphinx episode, although not part of the play’s action, was 
supposed to have taken place the day before, or not much earlier. The play would have begun on the 
morning after the incestuous marriage” (p. 312), on the ground that “detailed, ekphrasis-like 
descriptions in tragedy [such as we find in fr. 540 = A1, from a papyrus] are never used with reference 
to events in the distant past; it is only for very recent occurrences that the mode is reserved” (p. 311). It 
is clear from his n. 19 that he means not ‘in tragedy’ but ‘in tragic trimeters’, since ekphrasis-like 
descriptions are attested in lyric (to the examples that he cites we may add Eur. El. 452-78). But as he 
admits in the same note, detailed descriptions of the past are rare in tragic trimeters anyway; he cites 
only two examples, enough to establish that the presence of a detailed description of the past in tragic 
trimeters is not in itself suspicious, but woefully too few to establish the kind of characteristics that 
such a description must or must not possess.  
23 μόνον has the same effect, as Referee 2 points out. 
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24 As Referee 2 points out, τύραννος is used metaphorically in classical Greek: Eur. Hipp. 538 (Eros), 
Hec. 816 (Peitho), Pl. Resp. 573b (Eros). 
25 For a debate in tragedy on the value of holding political power see Soph. OT 584–99 (with τυραννίς 
592). 
26 Referee 2 points to Medea’s complaint about marriage (Eur. Med. 232–34) as equivalent to a 
woman’s purchasing a δεσπότης; Martin Cropp points to Eur. Phaethon fr. 775 ἐλεύθερος δ’ ὢν 
δοῦλός ἐστι τοῦ λέχους, | πεπραμένον τὸ σῶμα τῆς φερνῆς ἔχων (“Though a free man, he is a 
slave of the marrige bed, having sold his body for a dowry”; translation from Diggle 1970: 125), where 
a husband is his rich wife’s slave. 
27 For the polar expression in Greek thought see Lloyd 1966: 90–94. 
28 Diggle 1981: 29-30. 
29 Housman 1888: 271 = 1972: I 75; for this type of construction see Battezzato 2017 on the Hecuba 
passage. Referee 2 calls this ‘difficult, perhaps even impossible, with the predicate and the (articular) 
noun with which φανεῖσα agrees intervening’; certainly the word order is unusual, but whether it is 
impossible is something that only a native speaker could tell us. 
30 Referee 2 compares Eur. Cycl. 671, where -εσ- occurs in four consecutive syllables with no apparent 
significance. 
31 The point in this last sentence is owed to Referee 2, who additionally points to Willink 1986 on Eur. 
Or. 297: “διαφθείρεσθαι is applicable to any deterioration from ‘sound-mindedness’.” 
32 “Timidity and rashness are νόσοι in much the same way as an unbridled tongue (Eur. Or. 10)” 
(Martin Cropp, pointing also to Antiope fr. 226, which is not adequately dealt with by Liapis at p. 
350n162). 
33 Martin Cropp points out that the speaker may be speaking not in defiance of the gods, but out of the 
belief ‘that he does not need to fear divine punishment if he visits justice on someone who is not 
entitled to the gods’ protection”, comparing Creon’s religious arrogance at Ant. 280-89; he also notes 
that we do not know if the speaker acted on this declaration. 
34 Referee 2 points to Eur. Andr. 1002–8, where Orestes claims that Apollo will actually collude with 
Orestes’ murder of Neoptolemus, which will take place at Apollo’s own altar; and to Capaneus, who 
does not fear the power of the gods (Aesch. Sept. 427–31). 
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35 Thus fr. 542 (B2), fr. 543 (B3), fr. 545 (B4), fr. 546 (B6), fr. 548 (B8), fr. 549 (B9), fr. 544 (B10), fr. 
550 (B10a), fr. 551 (B11), fr. 552 (B12), fr. 553 (B13), fr. 554 (B14), fr. 554a (B15). 
